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The European Union’s decision to introduce a financial 








The Eurozone was left reeling after the sovereign debt crisis in 2009. Huge bailouts 
to governments and banks to stabilise the Euro ensued and policymakers within the 
European Union (EU hereafter) sought to find a solution to the vulnerability of the 
Euro to volatility induced by currency speculation.1 In 2011, a Financial Transactions 
Tax (FTT hereafter) was proposed by the European Commission as both a method of 
recovering some of the funds that were lost due to the remedial fiscal policies that 
were implemented after the crisis, and also to be used as a corrective mechanism in 
order to reduce the volatility apparently caused by high frequency trades and 
currency speculators.2 The tax was to apply to trades in stocks and bonds, as well as 
derivatives, at a harmonised minimum of 0.1 per cent and a 0.01 per cent tax rate 
respectively.3 
 
However, the controversial tax garnered opposition from within the EU from the 
outset and currently only ten countries within the EU (the ECP-10) have agreed to 
pursue the tax, albeit with waning interest and growing concern since the initial 
proposition.4 Critics of the tax argue that the scope of the tax has far reaching 
consequences: the FTT applies to transactions concerning any party from that tax 
jurisdiction meaning that it will apply outside the countries that have pursued the 
tax. This could have the effect of shifting transactions away from the EU and thus 
losing the revenue gaining potential of the tax. The tax has also been criticised on the 
basis that the corrective potential of the tax is limited as the incidence of the tax is 
                                                
1John Grahl, Photis Lysandrou, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax: A Critical 
Assessment,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, (2014): 234.  
2 See: Stephan Schulmeister, Margit Schratzenstaller, Oliver Picek, ‘A General Financial Transaction Tax: Motives, 
Revenues, Feasibility and Effects,’ (Research Study) Austrian Institute of Economic Research, (2008): 53.  
3European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a common Financial Transaction Tax and amending Directive 
2008/7/EC,’ (28/09/2011): 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/com(2011)594_en.pdf 
:(specifically Art. 8.2) p.19–20 
4See: Ott Ummelas, Rebecca Christie, ‘EU Financial-Transaction Tax’s Support Wanes on Scope, Ligi Says,’ Bloomberg, 
19/02/2014: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-02-19/eu-financial-transaction-tax-s-support-wanes-on-scope-ligi-
says.html  
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likely to fall on pension funds and governments as opposed to the financial sector 
that it is targeted at.5 
 
This paper will analyse the FTT as a policy instrument in the EU. It will do so in four 
parts: first, it will discuss the relevant background to the proposal in the IMF report 
on FTTs and will then provide an overview of the 2011 EU FTT proposal; second, this 
paper will evaluate some of the contesting arguments for and against an FTT 
amongst key member states of the EU, examining the main voices for the tax: France 
and Germany, and the most vocal opponent to the tax: the United Kingdom. Third, 
this paper will compare the FTT with possible alternatives to the tax that may or may 
not have been considered by policymakers in the Commission, such as a tax on 
financial assets (FAT); and last, this paper will conclude with a discussion on the 
effects and progress of the FTT, including the legal challenge from the UK in relation 
to the Council’s pursuit of an FTT through enhanced cooperation. Ultimately this 
paper will find that the issues surrounding the proposal of an EU FTT have had far 
reaching political and legal consequences, and, once the tax is implemented 
(scheduled for 1 January 2016), most likely economic consequences beyond the 
participating member states. 
 
Framing the 2011 FTT: The Monti Report and the G20 IMF Report. 
The IMF Report 
 
In 2010, G20 ministers commissioned the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
research possible tax instruments designed to curb the volatility induced by currency 
speculators and reduce the amount of high frequency trades within financial 
markets.6 The report investigated two tax policies: a Financial Transactions Tax 
(FTT), and a Financial Activities Tax (FAT), both of which will be discussed below.7 
An FTT is based upon the assumption that raising the cost of transactions will reduce 
the incentive for short-term, high-frequency traders to trade in high volumes − an 
issue that policymakers identified as an important contributing factor to the 
Eurozone crisis.8 Thus, the potential benefits of an FTT are twofold: first, an FTT 
would have significant revenue-raising capability, given the breadth of the tax base, 
and second, the tax could have significant corrective potential through raising the 
cost of transactions, thus providing a disincentive for traders to trade in high 
volumes as each transaction is to be taxed.9 An FTT had to be designed to maintain a 
                                                
5See: Patrick Honohan, Sean Yoder, ‘Financial Transactions Tax: Panacea, Threat, or Damp Squib?,’ The World Bank 
Research Observer, (2010):153–154; European Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive ! on a common system of financial transaction tax and 
amending Directive 2008/7/EC (Annex 12), vol.13 28/09/2011: 5   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/ftt_background_en.htm 
6Ross P. Buckley, Gill North, ‘A Financial Transactions Tax: Inefficient or Needed Systemic Reform?,’ Georgetown Journal 
of International Law, (2011/2012): 762–763.  
7See Stijn Claessens, Michael Keen, and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu ‘Financial Sector Taxation: The IMF’s Report to the G20 and 
Background Material,’ International Monetary Fund, (2010)  : 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/paris/pdf/090110.pdf  
8See European Commission, ‘Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Report on "Instruments for the Taxation of the 
Financial Sector,’ (28/09/2011): 2,   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/summ_impact_assesmt_en.
pdf  
9Sigurd Næss-Schmidt, Eva Rytter Sunesen, Martin Bo Hansen, Daniel Mekonnen Ali, ‘Tax Elasticities of Financial 
Instruments, Profits and Remuneration: Review of the Economic Literature, Working Paper no. 30,’ Copenhagen Economics 
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balance between the two objectives − that is, the tax rate had to be low enough so as 
not to divert trade to other lower tax jurisdictions, but had to be high enough in 
order for the revenue potential to contribute significantly to public finances.10 
Proposing such a tax was therefore ambitious from the outset, as the tax would 
require the willingness of member states to implement a minimum, uniform tax rate, 
thus ceding further control of tax policy over to the EU, and its potential revenue to 
the EU budget.11 
 
The 2011 EU FTT proposal 
 
Thus, on 28 September 2011, the European Commission proposed a harmonised 
Financial Transactions Tax for all member states, outlining the following reasons: 
 
• to prevent the fragmentation of the Single Market that could result from 
numerous uncoordinated national approaches to taxing financial transactions, 
• to ensure that the financial sector made a fair and substantial contribution to 
public finances, and 
• to discourage financial transactions which do not contribute to the efficiency 
of financial markets or of the real economy. 12 
From the objectives above, it is clear that an FTT was largely framed around the 
principle of making the financial sector make an equitable contribution to the real 
economies of states such that the revenue raising capabilities of the sector might be 
shared in a more socially constructive way.13 However, the other main political 
objective of the 2011 proposal was aimed at strengthening the Single Market by 
designing a tax policy that sought to harmonise tax rates on the sector at an EU level. 
This is particularly salient given that several member states already had an FTT of 
sorts in place at the time of the proposal, while a growing number of member states 
began looking to implement taxes in the near future.14 The tax was, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                  




11In the initial proposal, the Commission pushed for at least some of the tax revenues to be allocated to be used as an ‘own 
resource.’ Barry Larking, ‘Overview of National Taxation of the Financial Sector,’ Derivatives and Financial Instruments: 
IBFD, (2012): 71. 
12European Commission, ‘The original proposal of 28 September 2011…and its fate,’ (2014)   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm#fate; see the full Commission 
proposal: European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a common Financial Transaction Tax and amending 
Directive 2008/7/EC,’ (28/09/2011)   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/com(2011)594_en.pdf : 2.  
13 Larry Elliott, ‘At least Hollande and Merkel agree on one thing: a financial transactions tax,’ The Guardian, 16/05/2012,  : 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2012/may/15/hollande-merkel-financial-transaction-tax . For an 
examples see: Robin Hood Tax,  : http://robinhoodtax.org.uk - this group is a pro FTT lobby group based within the UK, that 
has garnered around 1 million supporters. 
14Christiana HJI Panayi, ‘The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation and the UK’s Challenge,’ European 
Taxation, (2013): 358; see also European Commission, ‘Tax reforms in EU Member States 2011: Tax policy challenges for 
economic growth and fiscal sustainability, European Economy 5,’ 2011: 37,   
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-5_en.pdf ; also ‘FTT – additional 
analysis of impacts and further clarification of practical functioning (fact sheet),’ DG Taxation and Customs Union, 
04/05/2012   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/fact_sheet/technical_fiches.
pdf: section 6.  
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promoted as an important mechanism for mitigating the fragmentation of the Single 
Market that would be brought about by discrepant tax rates throughout the EU, the 
effects of which would arguably have distortive effects on financial markets within 
the EU, and promote taxation competition between member states.15 
 
In order for this tax to be truly effective however, policymakers recognised that the 
end goal was to push for a global tax on financial transactions − thus the Commission 
acknowledged the need for an internationally coordinated taxation regime so as to 
mitigate international ‘leakages,’ or the migration of funds to jurisdictions outside 
the EU where the tax would not apply.16 Although this seemed like an ambitious task 
given that such a tax would require a level of consensus regarding the design and 
implementation of a tax across extremely disparate national economies and financial 
markets, and would require the overcoming of collective action issues on a politically 
sensitive topic, the tax was pushed at an EU level as policymakers rationalised the 
unilateral FTT so as to provide the impetus for other states to follow suit eventually.17 
Beneficial or Threatening? Responses to the proposal 
EU FTT as beneficial: France and Germany 
 
Germany has been particularly instrumental in pushing for the implementation of 
the EU FTT, although this can be attributed to domestic political factors as much as 
it has been about deeper integration of the Single Market. Indeed the SDP (Social 
Democratic Party) and the Greens were supportive of the implementation of an FTT, 
as the revenue-raising objectives of the tax were at the forefront of German 
policymakers’ minds given that Germany had footed much of the bill for bailing out 
Eurozone banks and member states.18 Although the EU-wide 2011 proposal of an 
FTT was stalled due largely to opposition from the UK and Sweden, the subsequent 
and revised FTT in 2013 became an important election topic; by 2013, the 
implementation of the FTT became even more of a politically sensitive topic in 
Germany as the looming vote on the Fiscal Compact placed pressure on Chancellor 
Merkel and the CDU (Christian Democratic Union), deadlocked in German 
parliament, to agree to Greens and SDP calls for support of the tax in order to obtain 
their votes for the ratification of the Compact.19 
                                                                                                                                                  
See: European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the financial 
transaction tax,’ 25/10/2012: 6–7,   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/com_2012_631_en.pdf  
15ibid; see also, European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Executive Summary of the impact assessment 
(Accompanying the document: Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and 
amending Directive 2008/7/EC) (28/09/2011): 3, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/sec/2011/1103/COM_SEC(2011)1
103_EN.pdf ; and European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Taxation of the Financial Sector,’ 
7/10/2010: 4,   http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/com_2010_0549_en.pdf. 
16Panayi, ‘The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation and the UK’s Challenge:’ 358; Honohan, Yoder, 
‘Financial Transactions Tax: Panacea, Threat, or Damp Squib?:’152; see also: Polly Curtis, ‘Is the City really under threat 
from Europe?,’ The Guardian, 08/12/2011   http://www.theguardian.com/global/reality-check-with-polly-
curtis/2011/dec/08/europeanbanks-conservatives?guni=Article:in%20body%20link  
17Panayi, ‘The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax:’358.  
18‘Expanded Euro Bailout Fund clears hurdle in Germany,’ New York Times, 31/08/2011,   
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/business/global/expanded-euro-bailout-fund-clears-hurdle-in-germany.html?_r=0  
19The Economist, ‘Taxing Financial Transactions: Heading for an Own Goal,’ 13/06/2012,   
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/06/taxing-financial-transactions ; ‘Rapid Outcome: Germany wants 
Transaction Tax by mid 2012,’ Der Spiegel, 12/03/2012   http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/rapid-outcome-
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Whilst in France, a proposed national FTT was implemented in 2012, amid what 
some analysts argued was a bid for votes by (then) president, Nicolas Sarkozy, in the 
upcoming presidential elections. 20  Both France and Germany highlight the 
importance that domestic public opinion and political pressures also had on the 
decision to pursue the tax, despite calls from the financial sector, and pressure from 
financial lobbies that the tax was ultimately harmful to long-term economic 
interests.21 
 
EU FTT as threatening: UK 
 
Whilst states such as Germany and France painted the proposed tax as being a useful 
policy instrument to raise revenue and ensure market stability, the United Kingdom 
has been highly critical of the tax, with members of the House of Lords arguing that 
the tax is going to fall unfairly and unevenly on different member states due to the 
location of the largest financial centres in the EU; Prime Minister David Cameron 
called the proposed tax “madness”, after vetoing the proposal in December 2011.22 
Given that the City of London is the biggest financial centre in Europe, much of the 
taxation would be collected from transactions conducted on the London stock 
exchange, leading Stuart Fraser, Policy Chairman of City of London Corporation, to 
argue: “clearly, with most of the revenues coming from the UK, a European FTT 
would be more of a tax on London than on the EU.” 23 
 
This point remains open to dispute given that the design of the tax meant that the 
geographical location of the transaction was not the sole basis upon which the tax 
could be levied − rather the tax would apply to EU based parties and instruments.24 
However, the concentration of trading does seem to be at issue here: the detrimental 
effects that the tax would have would be in reducing the amount of transactions 
taking place within big financial centres within the EU, notably, Frankfurt and 
London.25 This highlights another political and financial issue at stake for the United 
Kingdom: the 2011 proposal called for the FTT to be a replacement of existing FTTs 
already in place in member states, therefore, the UK would have to abolish its stamp 
duty, a source of national revenue generation for the UK for since 1986.26 Imposing 
an EU FTT would thus mean that the UK would lose this exclusive source of revenue, 
and instead the revenue (admittedly projected to be far greater due to the EU-wide 
                                                                                                                                                  
germany-wants-transaction-tax-by-mid-2012-a-820779.html ; see also Willem Van Veen, ‘How the Financial Transaction 
Tax Affects Pension Funds,’ Derivatives and Financial Instruments: IBFD, (2013):16.  
20Rupert Neate, ‘France Plans Tobin Tax on financial transactions,’ The Guardian, 31/01/2012,   
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/30/france-tobin-tax-nicolas-sarkozy  
21Martin Hesse, Christoph Pauly, ‘Financial Lobby in revolt: How much longer can transaction tax be delayed?,’ Der 
Spiegel, 20/03/2012,   http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/financial-industry-lobbyists-delay-financial-transaction-
tax-a-822186.html. 
22Panayi, ‘The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation and the UK’s Challenge:’ 364; Larry Elliott, Jill 
Treanor, ‘Davos: David Cameron urges Eurozone to take ‘bold and decisive action,’’ The Guardian, 26/01/2012,  : 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/26/davos-david-cameron-eurozone-wef ; Larry Elliott, Graeme Weardon, 
‘Merkel and Sarkozy push for greater European cooperation,’ The Guardian, 17/08/2011,  : 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/17/angela-merkel-nicolas-sarkozy-
summit?guni=Article:in%20body%20link  
23Stuart Fraser, ‘Letters: How Can You Tax Transactions that are no longer there?,’ Financial Times, October 6th 2011,   
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65ab35d4-ef7c-11e0-941e-00144feab49a.html#axzz327xyr331 ; it is worth noting that the 
UK was supportive of a global FTT proposal, but highly critical of the EU wide proposal.  
24Vogel, Cortez, ‘The Commission’s Proposal To Introduce an EU Financial Transaction Tax:’80.  
25ibid: 82.  
26Vogel, Cortez, ‘The Commission’s Proposal To Introduce an EU Financial Transaction Tax:’82.  
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scope of the tax), would instead go directly to the EU budget, to which the UK would 
contribute more than other member states, meanwhile there would be no guarantee 
that the UK would receive a proportionate share of their contribution back in the 
form of EU spending.27 Thus, implementing an EU FTT would mean ceding national 
control of revenue raising through taxation of the domestic financial sector, meaning 
that some member states would stand to lose out more than member states with 
smaller financial centres.28  Meanwhile, the far-reaching scope of the tax would 
reduce the efficiency and size of the City, thus diverting trade to other financial 
centres around the world.29 
 
Due to the opposition to the tax led by the UK, by September of 2012, only 11 
member states decided to pursue the tax outlined in the original Commission 
proposal through ‘enhanced cooperation,’ after the initial EU wide proposal failed to 
receive the required support in the European Council.30 As this is a last resort 
procedure, adoption of enhanced cooperation with regard to the FTT shows the 
conflict of interests within the EU over the tax. Interestingly, the tax has been largely 
opposed by member states that have traditionally been more on the side of 
‘euroscepticism,’ for example: the UK, Sweden and Denmark. 31 Thus, the proposal of 
an FTT speaks of a wider and historical political dynamic within the European 
Union, with France and Germany, typically advocates for deeper integration, forging 
ahead with the FTT, and the UK, typically eurosceptic, vehemently opposing the 
proposition. 
 
Limitations of the 2011 Financial Transactions Tax: possible 
alternatives and issues 
 
Narrow based FTT 
 
Whilst the September 2011 proposal advocated for the broadest tax base, a narrower 
based FTT could also have been considered. The “poster child” for this type of tax 
(narrow based) is the United Kingdom’s Stamp Duty or Stamp Duty Reserve Tax 
(SDRT).32 This tax has proven largely successful in terms of it not having overtly 
distortive effects on financial activities, even though the tax is levied at a higher rate 
than the proposed EU FTT: 0.5% on transactions on shares (and not derivatives), 
traded on the UK stock exchange, thus the tax applies only to transactions taking 
place within the UK.33 However, even though the UK has been largely successful with 
this tax for decades, the reason is largely that the taxation base is narrower than the 
                                                
27ibid.  
28ibid; Peter Kavelaars, ‘Bank Taxes in Forms and Sizes: EC Opts for FTT,’ Intertax, (2012): 403.  
29Næss-Schmidt, et al., ‘Tax Elasticities of Financial Instruments, Profits and Remuneration: Review of the Economic 
Literature, Working Paper no. 30:’ 36. 
30Only Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia pushed for the 
tax. See Council of the European Union, ‘Financial Transactions Tax: Council Agrees to Enhanced Cooperation,’ (Press 
Release) (2013): http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/134949.pdf  
31See Stephen George,’ Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic state,’ Journal of European Integration, (2007): 18-20 for an 
analysis of the UK’s euroscepticism.  
32Vogel, Cortez, ‘The Commission’s Proposal To Introduce an EU Financial Transaction Tax:’ 78.  
33Martin Hesse, Christoph Pauly, ‘Financial Lobby in revolt: How much longer can transaction tax be delayed?,’ Der 
Spiegel, 20/03/2012,   http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/financial-industry-lobbyists-delay-financial-transaction-
tax-a-822186.html 
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EU FTT, the trade off then is that the revenue-raising potential is compromised.34 A 
narrow based tax is therefore not conducive to the second goal of the 2011 proposal: 
making the financial sector contribute to public finances. Thus the Commission 
pushed for a wider based FTT, inclusive of derivatives and OTC transactions with a 
residence principle attached that meant that any EU company, institution would be 
subject to the tax (with exemptions granted to transactions made by central banks; 
and the raising of capital through primary market transactions i.e. issuance or 




Alternative taxation mechanisms were also investigated by the EU − chief among 
these was a Financial Activities Tax (FAT). A FAT differs from an FTT in that it taxes 
profits and remuneration. 36  The Impact Assessment (IA) of the 2011 EU FTT 
proposal compares the two tax instruments (FTT and FAT) to find that the FTT is 
more favourable in terms of revenue raising.37 Denmark, France and Italy each have 
an operative FAT of sorts, and an FAT may prove to be more viable as national 
taxation strategy rather than an EU wide tax: as the tax base is purely financial 
institutions, the tax is quite complex to implement and would require higher 
administrative costs.38 However, the FAT would arguably be more evenly distributed 
amongst due to the tax base being institutions and not transactions.39 Ultimately, 
given that the dual objectives of policymakers was to raise revenue and correct the 
market distortions and volatility in financial markets due to excessive automated 
trading, an FTT was deemed a better tax instrument as it sought to be a corrective 
device too.40 
 
Issues with the Proposed EU FTT 
 
One issue with an FTT is that it requires a large degree of coordination and 
consensus in order for it to be effective. It is evident, however, that even within the 
EU, this consensus is not possible, let alone harmonisation between the EU and 
other states on tax issues.41 In order for an FTT to realise significant revenue-raising 
potential, the tax must be implemented across a broad range of member states so 
that the tax base is not eroded and financial markets are not distorted through 
                                                
34Kavelaars, ‘Bank Taxes in Forms and Sizes:’403, 405 
35Sandy Bhogal, Alexandria Carr, James Taylor, ‘The FTT and European Sovereign Debt,’ International Financial Law 
Review, (2013):   http://search.proquest.com/docview/1431637692?accountid=12528  
36Kavelaars, ‘Bank Taxes in Forms and Sizes:’ 404; see also The European Commission, ‘Financial Transaction Tax: Staff 
Working Document No. 25,’ (2010): section 3.2,  : 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/sec_2010_1166_en.pdf 
37See European Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive !on a common system of financial transaction tax and 
amending Directive 2008/7/EC (Annex 8- Policy Options).  
38Kavelaars, ‘Bank Taxes in Forms and Sizes:’ 404. 
39ibid. The IA identified potential revenues for a FAT at an ‘illustrative rate of 5%’ to be between EUR 9.3 billion and EUR 
30.3 billion, while the FTT was initially estimated to potentially raise between EUR 16.4 billion and EUR 400 billion, 
however, subsequent estimations for the current FTT proposal generally predict revenues around the EUR 30-35 billion 
mark see: European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Executive Summary of the impact assessment:’ 5; see 
Taxation and Customs Union, ‘Taxation of the Financial Sector: Financial Transaction Tax, Proposal of 14 February 2013,’   
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/index_en.htm#fate . 
40European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: Executive Summary of the impact assessment:’ 6.. 
41Rainer Buergin, Brian Parkin, ‘Merkel Coalition Signals Retreat on Broad Financial- Market Tax,’ Bloomberg, 03/02/2014  
: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-02-03/merkel-coalition-signals-retreat-on-broad-financial-market-tax.html  
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migration to lower, or no tax jurisdictions. 42 Another issue is in where the actual 
economic incidence falls: proposing a tax in which the incidence falls on the financial 
sector looked, to policy makers and to the public, as if the financial sector was finally 
getting the retribution that they deserved from the Eurozone crisis.43 
 
The Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Financial Transaction Tax 2010 highlights 
that the corrective measures of a broad based FTT are problematic: while the amount 
of trading in secondary markets is likely to be reduced, thereby reducing the amount 
of purely speculative and ‘noise’ trading, other transactions that occur within the 
secondary market are often cited as being vital to the function of the real economy by 
reducing the costs of capital, thus, the real incidence, the economic, not just the legal 
has been called into question from the very outset.44 The abovementioned paper 
recommends against the adoption of a broad based FTT on the basis that the real 
incidence (the economic burden) is not for certain going to fall on the financial 
sector: 
 
In the context of a Financial Transactions Tax, the economic incidence of the 
tax could fall either on traders, on stock exchanges, on companies and 
governments (via higher capital costs) or on final consumers via higher prices 
for financial services.45 
 
The 2011 Impact Assessment on the EU FTT also supports this point, finding that: 
 
All in all, although the economic incidence of the tax instruments under 
analysis remains uncertain ex ante, part of the tax burden is likely to fall on 
final consumers of financial services … All in all … the FTT is likely to turn out 
not effective “at retrospectively targeting those who caused, or profited from, 
the recent financial crisis.” 46 
 
Picking up on this point, the United Kingdom has also argued against the 
implementation of a broad based FTT on the basis that the incidence could 
eventually be detrimental to pension funds.47 Indeed, the original 2011 proposal an 
                                                
42Panayi, ‘The EU’s Financial Transaction Tax, Enhanced Cooperation and the UK’s Challenge:’ 358; Honohan, Yoder, 
‘Financial Transactions Tax: Panacea, Threat, or Damp Squib?:’152.  
43The European Commission, ‘Financial Transaction Tax: Staff Working Document No. 25,’: Douglas A. Shackleford, 
Daniel N. Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, ‘Taxation and the Financial Sector,’ Taxation and the Financial Crisis, (Oxford:2012): 
153.;  
44See: The European Commission, ‘Financial Transaction Tax: Staff Working Document No. 25,’ (2010),  : 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/sec_2010_1166_en.pdf : see specifically 4.2, ‘The 
economics of FTT;’ The European Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Financial Transaction Tax 2010 highlights that it 
is often difficult to assess the difference between speculative and non-speculative transactions, or whether transactions are 
“beneficial or harmful” trades based solely on the timeframe within which they take place; Grahl, Lysandrou, ‘The European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax:’ 242; The European Commission, ‘Financial Transaction Tax: 
Staff Working Document No. 25,’ (2010),  : 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/sec_2010_1166_en.pdf : see specifically 4.2, ‘The 
economics of FTT.’ 
45The European Commission, ‘Financial Transaction Tax: Staff Working Document No. 25,’ (2010),  : 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/sec_2010_1166_en.pdf : see specifically 4.2, ‘The 
economics of FTT.’ 
46European Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment,’ 28/09/2011, (Annex 12): 5.  
47George Osborne,’ Correspondence: Letter from the Chancellor to the Chief Executive of the European Banking 
Federation,’ HM Treasury, 05/06/2013,   
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/205346/letter_cx_guidoravoet_050613.pdf  
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EU FTT affected a broad range of financial institutions: from investment firms to 
pension funds and commercial banks.48 
 
Finally, some critics have argued that an FTT could further render the European 
banking system at risk in global financial markets through the design of the tax: 
whilst the original Tobin Tax was directed at foreign exchange transactions, the 
proposed EU FTT did not apply to foreign exchange swaps (whereby banks 
collateralise short-term borrowing of foreign currency through the use of the US 
dollar).49 Instead, as Grahl and Lysandrou argue, the EU FTT goes against the 
principle of a Tobin Tax by “conferring a tax advantage” on foreign exchange swaps, 
as the scope of the tax was to include repo agreements, thus reducing the liquidity of 
bond markets and fostering the European banking system to be even more reliant on 
US credit conditions.50 This could in effect render European markets even more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in US markets, thus reducing even more the amount of 
autonomy of European banking institutions vis-à-vis global systemic conditions.51 
 
The FTT since 2012: assessing the FTT against original policy 
objectives 
 
UK’s legal challenge of the use of enhanced cooperation 
 
In April of 2013, the United Kingdom, amid parliamentary pressure from the House 
of Lords, launched a legal action against the Council, arguing that the mechanism of 
enhanced cooperation in relation to the FTT was illegal, and contravened article 327 
of the TFEU, stating that the authorisation of enhanced cooperation in this area 
would have “extraterritorial effects that will fail to respect the competences, rights 
and obligations of the Non-Participating States”; that the action was unlawful on the 
grounds that the measure would have “extraterritorial effects for which there is no 
justification in international customary law”; and that the Council’s decision 
contravened article 332 of the TFEU as implementation of an FTT would incur costs 
for Non-Participating States.52 
 
However, the UK’s appeal to the Court of Justice was quashed on 30 April 2014, and 
the remaining ten member states participating in the tax have pressed to implement 
the 2013 FTT in from 1 January 2016, although implementation of the tax is to be a 
phased approach, with only “shares and some derivatives” to be initially taxed. 53 
Arguably, the use of enhanced cooperation amongst ten member states, whilst the 
remaining 18 member states have opted out of pursuing the tax, shows that the first 
point of the rationalisation of the proposal − that of a harmonised approach to 
                                                
48Grahl, Lysandrou, ‘The Commission’s Proposal for a financial transactions tax:’236. 
49ibid:245-246. 
50ibid; see also, Bhogal, et al., ‘The FTT and European sovereign debt’ 
51Grahl, Lysandrou, ‘The Commission’s proposal for a financial transactions tax:’ 245-246. 
52Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Action brought on 18 April 2013 - United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v Council of the European Union (Case C-209/13),’  : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1400306914888&uri=CELEX:62013CN0209  
53Angela Monaghan, ‘George Osborne bristles as EU moves closer to financial transaction tax,’ The Guardian, 6th May 
2014,   http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/06/george-osborne-eu-financial-transaction-tax-legal-challenge . 
Slovenia did not sign the communiqué, despite pursuing the tax earlier.  
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taxation of the financial sector to avoid fragmentation − has largely been a failure.54 
Moreover, the revenue generating capabilities of the 2011 EU FTT have been 
significantly diminished as the tax base of transactions was eroded due to the non-
participation of 18 states, with the biggest financial centre, the City of London, opting 
out of the tax.55 Whilst this was circumvented by the ECP-10 states pursuing the tax 
by including a revised ‘issuance principle’ so that transactions involving parties from 
non-participating countries trading in financial instruments from a participating 
member state were liable to be taxed, the initial 2011 proposal obviously left this 
clause out on the presumption that the tax would be EU wide in scope. In policy 
terms, the addition of an issuance clause in the 2013 proposal can be largely viewed 
as a failing of the second justification of the proposal: ensuring that the financial 
sector would make a fair and substantial contribution to public finances.56 
 
Moreover, although the advancement of an FTT is a political win for the pro tax 
member states such as France and Germany, it is unlikely that the implementation of 
an FTT will set the global standard for a harmonised taxation regime, indeed, Van 
Vooren argues that the implementation of a global tax would need something of a 
global “political, legal and institutional revolution.” 57  The United States has 
reinforced this view, stating that they do not support the implementation of an FTT, 
arguing at the time, that the imposition of a tax on financial transactions would be 
detrimental to the ability of governments to access much needed capital, as such a 
tax would raise the cost of capital through reducing the efficiency of financial 
activity.58 Without the most significant international player even indicating support 
for a tax, the global end goal of the tax either looks to be rather utopian, or perhaps 
as if it signals empty political rhetoric on the part of policymakers in order to garner 
public support for the tax.59 
 
This has important consequences for the regional implementation of such a tax, for 
although it is too early to assess the actual consequences of the tax, the fact the tax is 
not to be uniformly implemented throughout the G20 states, or even the EU, means 
there is capacity for the tax to divert transactions to other geographical locations 
outside the jurisdictions participating in the tax, as the scope of the tax, although 
‘extraterritorial,’ remains porous and tax avoidance seems difficult to stop.60 Instead, 
the FTT may have the negative consequence of redirecting financial trading to other 
locations − the ramifications of which could include reduced liquidity in money 
markets, reduced market activity meaning less revenue potential, and increased costs 
of capital incurred by EU companies as a result.61 Another negative impact of the tax 
may be in the loss of innovation and efficiency in financial markets; a trade off due to 
the corrective potential of the tax in slowing down high frequency trading.62 Finally, 
                                                
54European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission:’ 4.  
55Panayi, ‘The EU’s Financial Transactions Tax, Enhanced Cooperation, and the UK’s Challenge:’ 365. 
56Grahl, Lysandrou, ‘The Commission’s Proposal for a financial transactions tax:’236-237.  
57Van Vooren, The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order: 330.  
58Buckley, North, ‘A Financial Transactions Tax:’ 786. 
59For example: Martin Hesse, Christoph Pauly, ‘Financial Lobby in revolt: How much longer can transaction tax be 
delayed?,’ Der Spiegel, 20/03/2012,   http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/financial-industry-lobbyists-delay-
financial-transaction-tax-a-822186.html  
60 Honohan, Yoder, ‘Financial Transactions Tax:’ 153;  
61 See Vogel, Cortez, ‘The Commission’s Proposal To Introduce an EU Financial Transaction Tax:’ 83; European 
Commission, ‘Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive !on a 
common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC (Annex 16), vol.13 28/09/2011: 7-8,   
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62 Honohan, Yoder, ‘Financial Transactions Tax:’ 140-143, 153-154.  
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on the retributive attributes of the EU FTT: while the idea of a ‘Robin Hood Tax’ 
appears to be appealing to the public through making some of the worst perpetrators 
in the crisis pay, this seems highly unlikely given that the FTT is likely to have far 
reaching consequences beyond the financial sector that will ultimately affect the end 
consumer of financial products and services.63 
 
The 2011/2012 Financial Transaction Tax proved to be a very divisive proposal that 
has had political and legal ramifications beyond the ten member states that have 
pursued the tax. Whilst the United Kingdom has protested the tax on legal, economic 
and political grounds, the use of the enhanced cooperation procedure has shown that 
the wishes of strongest states in the EU will ultimately be still be respected, even if 
the overwhelming majority of EU member states do not support a specific policy. 
With the deep political divisions between member states opposing the tax such as the 
UK and Sweden, and pro tax states such as France and Germany, the tax has added 
to the wider political differences between these states on the issue of Single Market 
integration.64 As such, the initial objective of seeking to find collective solutions to 
the economic effects of the Eurozone crisis, has not been realised, and the very 
fragmentary national financial taxation policies that the Commission was attempting 
to avoid have proliferated as the FTT has been stalled by legal challenges and 
enduring opposition from within the EU. Thus, the 2011/12 EU FTT proposals can 
largely be considered to be an EU wide public policy failure as it has been delivered 
at least two years late, and significantly watered down, while having serious and 
lasting political effects on the cohesion of the Single Market.65  
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